On 19 October 2005, Saddam Hussein walked into a courtroom in Baghdad wearing a dark suit and carrying a copy of the Quran. Two and a half years earlier he had been the unchallenged ruler of Iraq, a president who had held power for nearly a quarter of a century. Now he sat in a metal cage-like dock, flanked by guards, facing a panel of Iraqi judges and charges of crimes against humanity. The hearing lasted only 46 minutes, but it opened one of the most watched trials of the century — a trial that would end with a death sentence, and that would be condemned by human rights groups as deeply flawed even as many Iraqis welcomed its verdict.
The trial was the first attempt by a country to put its own former dictator on trial in its own courts, and almost everything about it was contested: the court’s legitimacy, the safety of its participants, and whether justice was even possible in a country still at war.
The crime at the centre: Dujail, 1982
The charges concerned a single episode from the early years of Saddam’s rule. On 8 July 1982, during the Iran–Iraq War, gunmen opened fire on Saddam’s motorcade as it passed through Dujail, a mainly Shia town about 60 kilometres north of Baghdad. The attack, carried out by members of the Islamic Dawa Party, failed. Saddam survived unhurt. What followed, prosecutors said, was a campaign of revenge against the whole town.
Iraqi security forces swept through Dujail, arresting hundreds of residents. According to the prosecution, 148 men and boys from the town were killed after being condemned by a Revolutionary Court, and 399 others were detained, many of them tortured and held for years in a remote desert camp. Farmland and date palm groves were destroyed, and the town’s water supply was cut. Saddam and seven co-defendants — including his half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, the former intelligence chief; former Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan; and Awad Hamed al-Bandar, the judge who had presided over the Revolutionary Court — were charged with crimes against humanity for their roles in the reprisals.
The Dujail case was chosen as the first trial deliberately. It was, by the standards of Saddam’s rule, a relatively contained episode with a clear paper trail, and prosecutors believed it could be proved in months rather than years. Far larger charges — the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, in which tens of thousands were killed, and the suppression of the Shia uprising of 1991 — were held back for later trials that, in the end, Saddam would never face.
A courtroom under siege
The trial was held before the Iraqi High Tribunal, a court created by Iraq’s interim government and modelled in part on international war crimes tribunals. From the start, it operated under conditions no ordinary court could recognise. Baghdad in late 2005 was in the grip of an insurgency, and the trial became a target. Three defence lawyers were murdered during the proceedings: Saadoun al-Janabi was abducted from his office and shot dead the day after the first hearing, in October 2005; Adel al-Zubeidi was killed in November 2005; and Khamis al-Obeidi, Saddam’s chief defence lawyer, was assassinated in June 2006. The Iraqi Bar Association boycotted the proceedings in protest at the lack of protection, and the defence repeatedly asked for the trial to be moved outside Iraq.
Inside the courtroom, Saddam was defiant. He refused to recognise the court’s authority, insisting that he was still the lawful president of Iraq and that he had been unlawfully overthrown. He interrupted the judges, shouted at prosecutors, and on several occasions had to be removed from the room. He went on hunger strike at least twice. His exchanges with the presiding judge became a regular feature of the televised coverage: Saddam, in a suit, lecturing the court about Iraqi sovereignty while the judges tried to keep order.
The first chief judge, Rizgar Mohammed Amin, a Kurd, resigned in January 2006, saying he could no longer cope with the political pressure on the court. He was replaced by Raouf Abdul Rahman, who ran the proceedings far more strictly and frequently ejected Saddam and his lawyers for outbursts. The trial was televised gavel-to-gavel in Iraq, and for many Iraqis it was the first time they had seen their former ruler answer questions rather than give orders.
The evidence and the verdict
The prosecution’s case rested largely on documents and on the testimony of survivors from Dujail, who described arrests, torture, and the disappearance of their relatives. Several witnesses testified from behind curtains, their identities concealed, because they feared reprisals. The defence argued that Saddam had acted lawfully as head of state, that the Dujail operation was a legitimate response to an assassination attempt during wartime, and that the tribunal itself was illegal because it had been created under occupation.
On 19 June 2006, the chief prosecutor called for the death penalty for Saddam and four of his co-defendants. The verdict came on 5 November 2006. Saddam was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by hanging. Barzan Ibrahim and Awad al-Bandar were also sentenced to death. Taha Yassin Ramadan was initially sentenced to life imprisonment, though that was later changed to death on appeal. Three local Baath Party officials from Dujail received 15-year prison terms, and one defendant was acquitted.
The timing of the verdict was politically charged: it was announced two days before the United States midterm elections, and critics noted that the date had been set well in advance. Saddam’s appeal was rejected by the tribunal’s appellate chamber on 26 December 2006, and under Iraqi law the sentence had to be carried out within 30 days.
The execution
Saddam Hussein was executed by hanging in the early hours of 30 December 2006, at about 6 a.m. Baghdad time, in a building in the Baghdad neighbourhood of Kadhimiya. The execution was filmed on a mobile phone by one of the guards present, and the grainy footage — in which Saddam is taunted by onlookers in his final moments — spread around the world within hours. The Iraqi government condemned the leak and the behaviour of the guards, but the damage was done: the manner of the execution, on the first day of the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha, drew criticism from governments and human rights groups across the world, including from some of the United States’ closest allies.
Barzan Ibrahim and Awad al-Bandar were executed on 15 January 2007. Taha Yassin Ramadan was executed in March 2007. With Saddam’s death, all the other charges against him — including the Anfal campaign and the suppression of the 1991 uprising — were dropped. A second trial, concerning the Anfal campaign, had already begun in August 2006, but it continued only against his surviving co-defendants.
Was it a fair trial?
The trial of Saddam Hussein remains one of the most argued-over court cases of modern times, and the argument is not about whether Saddam was guilty of terrible crimes — the evidence of his regime’s brutality is overwhelming — but about whether the trial itself met the standards of justice it claimed to uphold.
Human Rights Watch published a 97-page report on the Dujail proceedings in November 2006, concluding that the trial was “fundamentally unfair” and that the soundness of the verdict was questionable. Amnesty International condemned the appeal court’s decision and called for a retrial. Their criticisms were specific: the judges’ lack of experience with complex criminal cases, the political interference in the court’s work, the failure to protect defence lawyers and witnesses, and the fact that the tribunal issued no written reasoning for its verdict until more than two weeks after the sentence was announced. The written opinion, when it finally appeared, ran to 298 pages.
Supporters of the trial answer that it was an Iraqi court, applying Iraqi law, to an Iraqi leader, and that no international tribunal would have had jurisdiction or legitimacy in its place. They point out that the proceedings were televised, that Saddam was given lawyers of his choosing and the chance to speak at length, and that the verdict was reached by Iraqi judges rather than imposed by an occupying power. For many Iraqis, particularly the Shia and Kurdish communities who had suffered most under Saddam, the trial’s flaws mattered less than its outcome: the man who had ruled them by fear had been made to answer in a courtroom.
The legacy
The trial of Saddam Hussein set a precedent that has been debated ever since. It showed that a country emerging from dictatorship could put its former ruler on trial in its own courts, and it showed how difficult that is to do well when the country is still at war. Later trials of deposed leaders — Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, for example — faced many of the same problems: politicised courts, security threats, and the tension between the desire for swift justice and the demands of due process.
Saddam’s trial also left a gap in the historical record. Because he was executed after only the first of the planned series of trials, the fullest charges against him — the Anfal campaign, in which an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds were killed, and the chemical attack on Halabja — were never tested in court against him personally. The Dujail verdict answered for 148 deaths. The larger story of his rule was never put to a judge.
What is documented — and what is not
Documented: Saddam Hussein was tried before the Iraqi High Tribunal, beginning on 19 October 2005, for crimes against humanity arising from the killing of 148 people from Dujail after a failed assassination attempt on 8 July 1982. Three defence lawyers were murdered during the trial. Chief judge Rizgar Mohammed Amin resigned in January 2006 and was replaced by Raouf Abdul Rahman. On 5 November 2006 Saddam was sentenced to death by hanging; his appeal was rejected on 26 December 2006, and he was executed on 30 December 2006. Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti and Awad Hamed al-Bandar were executed on 15 January 2007. Human Rights Watch concluded the proceedings were “fundamentally unfair”.
Unverified or unproven: That the trial was deliberately timed to influence the 2006 United States midterm elections — the verdict date was set in advance and the timing was widely noted, but no evidence of coordination has been produced. Claims that Saddam was mistreated in custody beyond the documented taunting at his execution are not supported by the record. Any suggestion that the Dujail reprisals were ordered by Saddam personally, rather than carried out in his name by subordinates, rests on the tribunal’s findings, which were themselves contested.